Is Article 7 Really the EU’s “Nuclear Option”? by Pech, Laurent & Scheppele, Kim Lane
Kim Lane Scheppele , Laurent Pech Di 6 Mrz 2018 Di 6 Mrz 2018
Is Article 7 Really the EU’s “Nuclear Option”?
verfassungsblog.de/is-article-7-really-the-eus-nuclear-option/
In a rather prescient State of the Union address given in September 2013, the former
President of the European Commission, Mr José Manuel Barroso, highlighted the
increasing “challenges to the rule of law in our own member states” in the context of which
he referred to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union as the EU’s “nuclear option”.
When doing so, however, he only mentioned the suspension of a Member State’s rights.
This proved to be a rather unhelpful label as it undermined the dissuasive nature of Article
7 and furthermore led to a widespread belief that Article 7 only involved excluding the
Member State from participation in union decision-making. As previously noted, this is
however not correct because this provision also contains a preventive mechanism provided
for in Article 7(1) which can hardly be described as “nuclear”. It merely consists of enabling
the Council to formally recognise the existence of a risk of serious breach and adopt
recommendations to address the situation.
Frans Timmermans was therefore correct to point out that the preventive mechanism,
which was activated for the first time against Poland last December, is “not a nuclear
option”. Indeed, by activating Article 7(1), the Commission is merely asking the Council and
the European Parliament to decide whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the
rule of law, in which case “they can then also send recommendations to the Polish
government, and then take it from there. So it’s not a nuclear option. It’s again an attempt to
start a dialogue to resolve the situation.” Rather, the Commission’s (reluctant) decision to
initiate Article 7(1) reflects the failure of the Commission’s previous attempts to engage in a
dialogue with the Polish government within the framework of the so-called pre-Article 7
procedure.
Of course, there is a second mechanism within Article 7 provided in Articles 7(2) and (3).  
Under Article 7(2), a unanimous European Council plus two-thirds of the Parliament may
determine that there has, in fact, “a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the
values referred to in Article 2…” If such a determination is made, then under Article 7(3),
sanctions may be levied that “suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of
the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the
representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.” This is the part of
Article 7 that causes commentators to infer that any application of Article 7 is necessarily
nuclear. They forget that Article 7(1) provides a very different avenue for engagement with a
wayward Member State, an avenue that involves warning, dialogue and recommendations,
not sanctions.
So far, in the case the Commission’s recommendation to the Council on Poland and in the
case of the European Parliament’s resolution on Hungary, the immediate practical question
only involves Article 7(1), which is clearly non-nuclear. The question before European
bodies now is therefore only whether they will issue a warning to the governments of
Poland and Hungary that they have entered authoritarian territory. Failure to do so sends a
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dangerous signal that the actions of the Polish and Hungarian governments in
compromising the independence of their judiciaries, muzzling their media, attacking the civil
sector and interfering politically with the professional civil service does not pose a cause for
concern on the part of the other Member States. Talk of a nuclear option at this point is
unhelpful because that is not the option on the table at the moment.
But some sceptics seem to believe that European institutions should not invoke Article 7(1)
unless they can see a path to invoking Article 7(2) and (3) if the warning stage does not
succeed. Given the unanimity required of Article 7(2) and the mutual promises that Poland
will vote against sanctions for Hungary and vice versa, it appears to many that a persistent
and serious breach can never be determined under Article 7(2). This leads some to believe
that there is therefore no point in triggering Article 7(1) (there may however be ways around
the fellow-traveller veto: see this proposal). But this misunderstands the structure of Article
7. It is not necessarily the case that Article 7’s different parts move in lockstep from one
stage to another.
The relationship among the parts of Article 7 may look like a progression from a warning to
a determination of a breach to sanctions. It can in fact be used that way. But there is more
flexibility in the relationship among the parts of Article 7 than this and not just because the
sanctioning mechanism involves unanimity at the choke point before sanctions can be
levied.  For example, there is no requirement that expressed concern about a Member
State must start with Article 7(1). The Commission could well have started with Article 7(2)
and ask the European Council to decide whether a serious and persistent breach of the rule
of law has already occurred in Poland. As we have argued before, in Hungary, the
government has dismantled checks on the power of the prime minister and destroyed the
independence of virtually all checking institutions, including the judiciary, over eight long
years, which to us more than meets the standards of a serious and persistent breach.
Given Hungary’s track record, the Commission (or for that matter, one third of the Member
States) could start theoretically with Article 7(2).
Similarly, EU institutions might warn a Member State under Article 7(1) and hope that
invocation of the later parts of that Article may not be necessary. Even if the Member State
fails to take the advice of the other Member States under Article 7(1), there may be other
options open to the Commission to carry forward the attempt to get the Member States in
question to comply outside the framework of Article 7. For example, the Commission could
bring more systemic infringement actions or EU institutions could condition the continued
flow of EU cohesion funds to a wayward state dependent on compliance with Article 2
values. The reactions of a Member State to an Article 7(1) dialogue and accompanying
recommendations may provide important input into the determination of whether these
other sanctioning mechanisms should be used.
Article 7 is one important tool in the mix for EU institutions to use, but it is a set of
resources that are not necessarily linked as rigid stages from warning all the way through to
suspension of some or all of the privileges of Member States. Moreover, it can be used as
one element in a mix of other sanctioning mechanisms outside the framework of Article 7.
Article 7 may become potentially very powerful by excluding a Member State from
participation in Union decision-making, but it can be used in various ways and alongside
other strategies to bring a Member State into compliance with EU values, which is the
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ultimate goal.
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